

Democratic Discipline over the Soldiers: The Post-2004 Dynamic Mapping of Civilian Control over the Military in Indonesia

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Abstract

This article attempts to explain the development map of the quality of democratic control over the military in Indonesia from 2004 to the second period of Joko Widodo's administration. Some of the questions that will try to control are, why did the president with a retired military general background be considered as having the modality in building a civilian control over the military after the Reformation? And how was the institutionalization of civilian control over the military? This study was conducted based on a literature study and news analysis about civilian control over the military since 2004. The year 2004 was a turning point in the dynamics of civil-military relations in Indonesia to find its ideal form in the context of capable civilian control over the military, after more than three decades involvement of military groups into Indonesian politics throughout the New Order era. At the beginning of the Reformation era, the civilian government at that time was still not paying serious attention on efforts to subordinate military groups under civilian rule, resulting in uncondusive observations of civil-military relations in the first years of the Reformation. The euphoria of the Reformation tend to direct civil attention to the issues of post-New Order political institutionalization, until finally Indonesia was only able to organize a viable electoral system in 2004, which at that time was won by presidential pairs of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and vice president Jusuf Kalla (JK). The elected President, SBY as the only president in the Reformation era with a retired military general background is considered to be a modality to stop the confusion of civilian government attitudes towards military groups in Indonesia in building civil supremacy over the military. However, the success of civilian control over the military still rests on the personal power of the head of state rather than as a result of the institutionalization of an established civilian control scheme over the military.

Key words: Reformasi, civil supremacy, political modality

INTRODUCTION

The rolling of the reformation era, which was closely related to the nuances of strengthening civil democracy, strengthened public optimism, both at home and abroad, regarding the expectations of the re-democratization project in Indonesia. The euphoria of the Reformation order was marked by the change of office of the president three times in a period of only five years (1998-2004), these years indicate that the dynamics of democracy in the country are still in search of solid ground for ideal political institutionalization. The context of these political dynamics has resulted in civil-military relations in Indonesia not receiving sufficient attention in efforts to uphold civilian control over the military by institutionalizing the professionalization of the armed forces institutionally. In addition, the fast-moving political dynamics that create uncertainty among civil society layers can lead to the risk of military groups entering civilian politics

to take over political leadership in order to accelerate political stability, as was the case in the Old Order multi-party democracy era.

Time has passed as the three presidents have alternated, but the great concern about the return of military intervention in civil politics in Indonesia has not yet occurred, leaving the conclusion that since the beginning of Reformation the military has no longer had the desire to return to politics. In addition, the issuance of Law no. 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Armed Forces which was signed by President Megawati Soekarnoputri on October 16 2004 finally confirmed the professionalism of the military and made the military a subordinate of civilian groups. The dilemma over the issuance of the law began to emerge with the implementation of the second round of presidential elections which took place previously, on 20 September 2004 which gave victory over the presidential pair Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and vice president Jusuf Kalla (JK), indicating that the full realization of the law This will eventually be carried out by the SBY-JK government which was sworn in on October 20, 2004.

Besides that, Said (2018) provides an analysis which states that military groups in Indonesia have carried out internal reforms since 1998, starting with the development of skepticism among military officers who view that the participation of military groups in civilian politics is carried out by civilian political elites with the aim of increasing the influence of power. of the civilian political elite. The inclusion of the military element in Indonesian political history is inseparable from the history of the civilian political regime itself. Thus the military, both individually and institutionally within ABRI, initially had no interest in dealing with civilian politics. However, along with the strengthening of societal polarization after the opening of the Multiparty Democracy era with a parliamentary system of government which took place in chaos, this sparked the emergence of the self-perception of the military as heroes of independence who must have a stake in the political situation of Indonesian society which is currently fragmented, accompanied by the emergence of political rebellions in several parts of Indonesia. area (ibid, p. 11).

The inclusion of military groups into politics can be seen from the concept of power of civilian groups who deliberately invite these groups to increase their political influence, so that the balance of power they have is superior to other political actors. The context of power is important to emphasize considering the role of the military in civil politics aims to create an unequal political ecosystem.

In general Dowding (1986) divides two concepts regarding power, namely "power to" and "power over". This categorization is deemed necessary considering that the concept of ownership of a form of absolute power is too given and closes the possibility of examining layers of power. The concept of "power to" refers to actions where actor A is able to do something, based on the aggregate power he has. Meanwhile, the concept of "power over" projects that actor A has power over actor B to make actor B take certain actions.

The concept of "power to" is considered the most basic concept in the use of the term "power". The explanation of the two concepts can be seen as a relationship that creates

implications, where "power over" also implies that actor A has power over actor B, also means that he has the power to cause actor B to take action that leads to the desired result. by actor A. For example, the awarding of the Supersemar mandate to Suharto enabled him to gather strength from (power over) elements of anti-communist civilian militias and the military to (power to) eradicate exponents of the Indonesian Communist Party—which at that time was actually the base for supporting Soekarno's power. This incident then led Suharto to the results that allowed him to seize power from Sukarno, namely the absence of political parties as an excess of the implementation of Guided Democracy, as well as the annihilation of the PKI as the only remaining supporter of the Old Order regime. This condition caused Soekarno—as the representative of the PNI mass base—to face Suharto—as the representative of the anti-communist mass base and the armed forces.

The concept of aggregation of power at the end of the Old Order era was then adapted by the authors to map out the composition of power available in society during the Reformation era, as well as who the political actors were in the Reformation era. This discussion was then continued by moving from the first years of reform to 2004, where president SBY as the first president of the Reformation era with a retired background was then elected in a situation of political trends which experienced a slowdown since the start of the Reformation era. This political situation is an ideal precondition for the implementation of policies on military institutions as stated in Law no. 34 of 2004 which separates the functions of the military and police as well as military professionalism. Besides that, SBY's agency modality as a retired TNI general enabled him to communicate better with internal TNI officials than his predecessors who had civilian backgrounds.

Huntington's (2000) objective civilian control theory is used in this study to assess the influence of post-2004 political institutionalization on military institutions, as well as examine military professionalism in every civil government policy aimed at these institutions. Objective civilian control, as stated by Huntington, positions the armed forces as a type of profession among the various other professions available in society, so that it is assumed that soldiers only carry out military domestic duties rather than participating in civilian politics. The implication of the objectification of the military profession to the democratic political ecosystem is the loss of opportunity for civilian political groups to form alliances with military groups in strengthening their political position. Thus, the professionalization of the military in a democratic country implies the establishment of political institutionalization and political order as a prerequisite for achieving democratic order and civilian supremacy over the military.

For Huntington (1973), a government with a low level of institutionalization is not only included in the category of weak government, but also as bad governance. This is because the main function of government is to regulate or administer arrangements, so that a government with low consensus on implementation will fail to carry out its functions. Huntington's basic argument is that the moral basis for the administration of a legitimate government is the mutual agreement of the entire population, regardless of

their political choice, that a government that rises as ruler is a government that wins democratic consensus (majority rule).

The inclusion of military elements by civilian political groups into democracy also has the potential to make the military a coercive element of the civilian groups that become its allies. Democratic political decline inevitably occurs when the military element is then used to prop up authoritarian civilian rule as well as a function of silencing the diversity of political expression of the entire population.

METHOD

The method used in this research is a qualitative method operationalized in the form of a literature study on a number of literatures and analyzing news relating to agencies or 'persons' within the military and military institutions themselves. The data is validated by comparing a number of media reporting sources so that a level that allows for data triangulation can be achieved, which requires the existence of an idea that is generally accepted by the media public, thereby presenting news analysis from media sources whose content is no longer debatable.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Military Reform and Professionalization

Civilian control of the military has become an important part of the study of democratic transitions in countries that have recently broken away from the control of authoritarian governments (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Diamond & Plattner, 1996). Likewise with the democratic transition in Indonesia that took place during the Reformation era, with the achievement in the form of military reform which had preceded civilian plans for subordination of the military under civilian control, leaving only problems in the form of takeovers of military group businesses and the Law on Military Courts (Kompas, 2008). Likewise with Said (2018) who stated that military reform which began in 1998 could make it possible to occur due to the renewal of the ranks of New Order military officers who received general military education, which had a different character from the generation of 'officer 45' who had a background as freedom fighter.

The 'new generation' military officers at the end of the New Order's power were ranks of military officers who were outside the circle of clientelistic relations between the old generation of officers, '45 officers', or 'Workforce' officers and the New Order regime. The new generation of officers has the view that the entry of the military into civil politics is a 'side business' of a soldier rather than as a state duty outside of security duties (ibid, p.13). The self-view of the new generation of officers has reflected a professional armed forces which indicates the abolition of the status quo within the military, accompanied by the conviction that the entry of the military into politics at the invitation of civilian political elites is nothing but an attempt to use military groups as a supplement to political power, as practiced between the old generation of officers and President Soeharto.

The Reform process, which proceeded without military intervention, allowed civilian

groups to issue Law no. 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Armed Forces which provides a legal basis for the separation of the roles of the armed forces in civilian life (abolition of the Dwifungsi ABRI) and encourages military professionalism. Institutional implementation of military reform has been carried out independently, so that the inclusion of a ban on members of the TNI from engaging in politics in Article 39 of the law has become a legal norm for any violations committed by members of the TNI.

In an effort to outline the professionalization of the military, in 2010 the SBY administration issued Presidential Decree No. 41 of 2010 concerning the General Policy of State Defense which is a follow-up to the State Defense White Paper published by the Ministry of Defense in 2008 which includes doctrine, strategy, defense policy, and projected development of defense posture (Gunawan, 2017). It should be noted that the Perpres contains only a few additional inputs compared to the Defense White Paper published by the Ministry of Defense, due to the nature of the expertise of the Ministry of Defense which consists of technocrats with military backgrounds.

As a follow-up to the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 41 of 2010, President SBY made a defense policy in the form of a Minimum Essential Force (MEF) to carry out long-term modernization of defense equipment, which was followed by the formulation of a new defense doctrine for the TNI to adjust the utilization of soldiers against new security threats. This indicates that the main preconditions have been developed in the form of professionalization of the military, especially in the aspect of increasing the capacity of military institutions in dealing with security threats.

Viewed from the optics of power, the MEF's defense policy which strengthens military professionalization keeps military groups busy with efforts to build gradual defense capacity rather than entering into the area of civilian politics. The scheme of power that emerges from the program is to establish a reference object in the form of increasing the defense capacity of the three dimensions by modernizing the defense equipment and granting autonomy in planning and formulating the military budget granted by the Ministry of Defense to each dimension within the TNI in order to fulfill security achievements. Through the Ministry of Defense, MEF is used as an object of defense achievement that enables the civil administration to direct the behavior of the TNI towards the task of fabricating national defense.

The Role of Agencies in Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia

Challenging the opinion of institutionalists who emphasize institutional change within the armed forces, the agency approach can be used to assess military professionalization programs by showing personal inclinations rather than agents in the decisions taken against military groups. The agent's personal inclination can be described as a condition in which the experience, understanding, and education of a military agent influence the way he or she makes decisions as a civilian politician—in this case a state leader or president.

President SBY succeeded in establishing the strongest civilian control over the military in Indonesian history, this success was none other than his background as a

former general who had served in the New Order military officer environment. This experience allowed him to build relationships with fellow officers, and know who could be relied upon to lead positions in the TNI when SBY served as president later (Kemenkopolkam RI, 2000; Merdeka.com, t.thn.). One example of the influence of SBY's military background was when he appointed Djoko Santoso as TNI commander for no reason. They had established intimacy when SBY was still serving as Chief of the Territorial Staff in 1998. At that time, Djoko was trusted as SBY's representative (Tirto.id, 2018).

As a consequence of the relationships he has with the TNI's internal environment, President SBY often uses a 'soft power' approach in coordinating with TNI institutions through his loyalist channels in the TNI's top ranks. Based on the thinking character of the 'new generation' military force, SBY tends to use an internal security approach that emphasizes the importance of political negotiations rather than security achievements based on the success of military operations. For example, President SBY no longer persecuted the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) militants after the group's strength decreased significantly after the tsunami disaster that hit Aceh in 2004. As a way out to end the conflict between the central government and the GAM militant group, SBY made a peace agreement known as the Helsinki Agreement signed in Helsinki, Finland in 2005, ended the bloody conflict that had been going on for approximately 30 years (Tempo, 2005; Liputan 6, 2015).

However, despite the achievements in building more professional military institutions under SBY's leadership, the regeneration of the TNI's professionalism is an obstacle that will be faced when SBY is no longer president. This again reminds us of the importance of the institutional approach, where this approach has the advantage of revealing changes in the structure and function of military institutions. The MEF policy made by President SBY has indeed indicated a reshuffle of several posts in the military structure to deal with post-Reform security challenges, such as armed groups in conflict-prone areas, terrorism, and efforts to deal with terrorism if foreign troops enter the territory of the Republic of Indonesia to eradicate terrorist groups. However, it was soon realized that the re-functionalization of the military's duties to face these security challenges had the potential to increase the military's budget to balance the military's tasks in achieving these new security achievements.

Evidence from the re-functionalization of military tasks in the MEF scheme emphasizes the use of the land force even in combat conditions. The archipelago is known to consist of many islands, with a total ocean area that exceeds the land area. This is more due to the large number of TNI headquarters staff who have an Army background than the other two dimensions. In addition, the renewal of the defense doctrine within the MEF allows the Army to have a bigger role in territorial defense, considering that the new security focus (eliminating armed groups and terrorist groups) implies that combat will predominantly take place on the ground.

In addition, the burden on the military budget will continue to increase along with the need for modernization of defense equipment, which also means the need to prepare

infrastructure for the placement and transportation of combat equipment to the intended field. For example, the government's priority in strengthening the ground force combat fleet with the project to purchase the Leopard 2 MBT requires the construction of infrastructure in the form of new railroads to transport the combat equipment to the area of operation (detikNews, 2014). Based on the consideration of the consequences of increasing the military budget, the decision taken to professionalize the military through the MEF program provided flexibility for the president to maintain military subordination and eased the burden on the civilian executive (president and the Ministry of Defense) in managing the next subordination scheme, especially for presidential candidates who did not have a military background later in life.

CONCLUSION

This paper focuses on the distribution of civil and military power in the policy area that is directly related to the main function of the military, namely national defense. An analysis of phase I MEF policies in Indonesia from 2010 to 2014 found that the Indonesian government used a layering mechanism to encourage policy changes in the defense sector amidst institutional conditions that did not allow for radical changes. Without erasing or radically changing the sishanta doctrine, the MEF policy emerged as a new element in the Indonesian defense sector which could then be relatively supported by political forces in the Government, the DPR and the TNI itself. However, this article also highlights the disadvantages of using the layering mechanism in MEF policies. The status quo has not changed, meaning that the TNI's self-perception is still strong as the dominant actor in the defense sector which has resulted in low levels of compliance in the implementation of MEF phase I which has resulted in the emergence of ineffective defense equipment purchased, criminal acts of corruption, and minimal infrastructure support for defense equipment. recently purchased. These findings open up opportunities for further studies regarding the impact of MEF policies on the quality of civilian control over the military in Indonesia in the future. If MEF policy inconsistencies continue, it is not impossible that MEF implementation in the next stage will be disrupted or even worse, encounter systemic failure. In the context of civil-military relations in a country that has just experienced a transition to democracy, disruption or possible failure in efforts to promote military professionalism through defense policy can have fatal consequences for the sustainability of democracy. Professional identity within the military may develop only partially or stagnate, and if political stability deteriorates, the military may at any time return to the realm of practical politics.

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