Delayering as Redistribution: The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Simplification in Indonesia

Abstract

Indonesia’s bureaucratic simplification reform, particularly the large-scale conversion of mid-level structural
positions into functional roles, has been widely framed as a technocratic effort to enhance efficiency, agility,
and professionalization within the public sector. This paper challenges such a perspective by conceptualizing
delayering as a political economy process of redistribution. Drawing on political economy theory,
institutionalism, policy design, and state capability literature, the study examines how reform reshapes
authority, incentives, and bureaucratic capital within the state apparatus. Using a mixed-method approach, the
analysis combines administrative data from the National Civil Service Agency (2020–2024) with qualitative
assessment of regulatory frameworks and institutional implementation. The findings indicate that while
structural flattening has been formally achieved, the redistribution of authority has not resulted in full
decentralization. Instead, decision-making tends to be consolidated at higher organizational levels, while
functional roles expand without equivalent adjustments in incentive systems and career structures. This
misalignment generates implementation gaps and uneven reform outcomes across ministries, reflecting
variations in institutional capacity. The study contributes to comparative public administration by reframing
bureaucratic simplification as negotiated redistribution rather than purely technical reform. It also highlights
the importance of policy design coherence and institutional readiness in ensuring that structural transformation
leads to substantive professionalization. The findings offer practical implications for strengthening merit
systems and aligning incentives in public sector reform, particularly in developing-state contexts facing
governance complexity and economic uncertainty.